In its report, published at the start of the 2001 Parliament, the Commission found that "Parliament has been left behind by far-reaching changes to the constitution, government and society in the past two decades", with the central question of Westminster's scrutiny of the executive left unaddressed, and serious gaps and weaknesses evident in the working of accountability. The Commission declared that "Parliament must adapt quickly if it to retain its centrality to British politics and be effective in holding government to account".

The Commission laid out seven principles that should guide reform of accountability as exercised through Parliament. These principles were supplemented by detailed recommendations. The seven principles were:

• Parliament at the apex. The central theme of the report was that Parliament should be at the apex of a system of accountability also constituted by independent regulators, commissions and inspectors.

• Parliament must develop a culture of scrutiny: changes in the attitudes and behaviour of politicians were as important as changes in the working of Parliament.

• Committees should play a more influential role within Parliament. In particular, the committees' role "needs to be more closely defined, so that each has a set of core responsibilities and a set of certain pre-agreed and public goals". Also, "chairing a select committee needs to be recognised as a political position comparable to being a minister ... [and] the committees should be given the staffing and resources needed to oversee the areas for which they are responsible".

• The chamber should remain central to accountability. As the "public face of the House of Commons and therefore the main means of informing and persuading the wider electorate ... the chamber should be more responsive to issues of public concern".

• Financial scrutiny should be central to accountability. Financial scrutiny "underpins all other forms of accountability" and thus "should be central to the work of the Commons".

• The House of Lords should complement the Commons, with the unelected chamber contributing especially on issues which cross departmental boundaries, and on ethical, constitutional and social issues for which the Commons has insufficient time.

• Parliament must communicate more effectively with the public, through reforms to sitting hours, procedures, the structure of staff support and the use of technology.

• Introduction

• Executive summary

• The changing role of Parliament: New forms of accountability

• Building a culture of scrutiny in th eCommons

• Reforming the select committees

• Restoring the centrality of the Commons chamber

• Parliament and financial scrutiny

• Scrutiny, accountability and the second chamber

• Two-way communication: Parliament and the outside world

• Parliament at the apex

• Conclusions and recommendations

• Appendices

  • Appendix 1 - The theory and practice of parliamentary accountability

  • Appendix 2 - Written evidence submitted to the Commission

  • Appendix 3 - Meetings of the Commission

  • Appendix 4 - Survey of MPs: The effectiveness of Parliament, parliamentary roles and workloads

  • Appendix 5 - Survey of the subject-matter of House of Commons Select Committee Reports; Sessions 1997-98 and 1998-99

  • Appendix 6 - Financial Procedures

• Bibliography

• Index